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TITLE VII AS A REMEDY FOR ALLEGED
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION BY STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYERS: IS IT EXCLUSIVE OR
ONLY SUPPLEMENTARY TO 42
U.S.C. § 1983?
Congress made Title VII applicable to state and local government employees in
1972. The lower federal courts disagree as to whether Title VII is their exclusive
remedy, or whether section 1983 is alsoavailable to them as a remedy for employment
discrimination. Courts which subscribe to exclusivity place unnecessary burdens on
state andlocalgovernment employees. Legislative history demonstratesthat Congress
did not intendfor Title VII to be an exclusive remedy. Further Title VII and section
1983 have independent substantivebases. Therefore, state and local government employees cannot be compelled to exhaust Title VII administrative procedures before
advancing section 1983 claim.

INTRODUCTION

IN 1972, Congress expanded the scope of the conciliation-prodding
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 As a
result of the 1972 amendments, Title VII is now applicable to state
and local government employers.2 For ninety-nine years prior to
the amendments, only the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983' protected
state and local government employees from unlawful state action.
As a result, there has been uncertainty and disagreement among the
lower federal courts on the question of whether Congress intended
to make Title VII the exclusive avenue available to state and local
government employees for litigating their employment discrimination claims.4 Unfortunately, this issue has not been definitively resolved. Implicit in the conflicting opinions of courts which have
petition for authoritative
considered this issue lies an unofficial
5
assistance from the Supreme Court.

This Note analyzes the exclusivity issue which has stymied both
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-713, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964) (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. 1984)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); see infra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982 & Supp. 1984) (originally enacted as Civil Rights Act of
1871, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1970)).
4. See infra notes 50-138 and accompanying text.
5. This conflict has prompted one judge to plead that "perhaps the Supreme Court
itself will one day tell us all who is right." Torres v. Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Social
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litigants and courts. Part I reviews the purpose and passage of both

section 19836 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 7 and the motivation
behind Title VII's expansion to encompass state and local government employers in the 1972 amendments.' Part II analyzes two recent, conflicting decisions dealing with the exclusivity issue. 9 Part
III explains the problems which exclusivity presents by comparing
the substantive, procedural, and remedial provisions of Title VII
1 °
and section 1983, and the role of resjudicata.
In Part IV, this Note demonstrates that both Title VII and section 1983 must be available to state and local government employees as alternative grounds for redress of their employment
discrimination claims."1 Unambiguous congressional purpose, evidenced in extensive legislative history, supports this conclusion.12
There is further support in the separate and independent substantive bases of Title VII and section 1983.13 Since section 1983 is an
independent remedial provision for enforcing separate rights and affords distinct remedies, the exhaustion of Title VII requirements
cannot be compelled in a section 1983 action, even if the same factual allegations support both claims and they are brought in the
same action.
I.

THE STATUTORY SOURCE OF THE CONFLICT

A.

Section 1983

Congress enacted section 1983 as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1871.14 Section 1983 does not itself confer any substantive right.15
Services, 592 F. Supp. 922, 931 (E.D. Wis. 1984). See also Zewde v. Elgin Community College, 601 F. Supp. 1237, 1248 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (echoes the plea of the Torres court).
The Supreme Court recently declined the opportunity to settle this issue by denying certiorariof a Seventh Circuit case which confirms that circuit's position that Title VII is not the
exclusive employment discrimination remedy for state and local government employees. Chicago Park Dist. v. Alexander, 773 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 106 S.Ct. 1492 (Mar.
31, 1986) (Lexis).
6. See infra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 21-38 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 49-137 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 138-208 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 209-59 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 219-38 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 247-53 and accompanying text.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982 & Supp. 1984). For a more detailed discussion of the procedural, substantive, and remedial aspects of a § 1983 claim, see infra notes 140-94 and accompanying text.
15. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979). In contrast,
Title VII confers substantive rights. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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Instead, it provides a remedy for relief 16 from actions taken under
color of state law which contravene federally protected rights,
whether those rights are secured by the United States Constitution
or derived from federal legislation.17 Thus, if a discharged state or
local government employee can establish that his release violates a
provision in the Constitution, such as the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment 18 or a federal statute which does not preempt section 1983 with its own comprehensive remedial scheme, he
may invoke section 1983 to remedy that unlawful action. That
plaintiff must establish each element of his underlying claim and

must further demonstrate that the employer's action was taken
under color of state law.1 9 Congress intended that section 1983
counteract state and local laws that deprive individuals of their federal rights. Section 1983 compensates when state law cannot sufficiently protect federal rights and is supplementary to state remedies
which protect individuals from the possibility of state prejudice or
20
ineffective enforcement of state law.

B. The History and Purpose of Title VII
Surviving a "torrid conception... turbulent gestation and...
frenzied birth,"2 1 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 broke

new ground as the first major federal remedial scheme for combatting discriminatory employmeift practices. Title VII creates en16. Federal judicial jurisdiction for claims brought under § 1983 is founded on 28
U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1982 & Supp. 1984). See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S.
538, reh'g denied, 406 U.S. 911 (1972).
17. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (section 1983 covers violations of the Social
Security Act). The potential consequences of the broad proclamations of the Thiboutot decision have subsequently been diminished by the Supreme Court in Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). Middlesex held that where
Congress has supplied comprehensive remedies in a particular piece of legislation this "may
suffice to demonstrate Congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983."
I. at 21. See Jones, For One and AlL" § 1983 Confers Court Jurisdictionfor Violations of
FederalStatutory Rights by State and Local Government Officials, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 45
(1981).
18. "The Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause prohibits intentional discrimination based on membership in a particular class.., including acts of employment
discrimination." Trigg v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 766 F.2d 299, 300 (7th Cir.
1985). The plaintiff must demonstrate that he is receiving different treatment than that received by others who are similarly situated. Kuhar v. Greensburg Salem School Dist., 616
F.2d 676, 677 n.1 (3d Cir. 1980).
19. See infra notes 153-56 and accompanying text for further discussion on the color of
state law requirement.
20. Note, Civil Rights Suits Against State and Local Government Entities and Officials.
Rights of Action, Immunities, and Federalism, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 945, 951 n.21 (1980).
21. Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283, 286 n.13 (5th Cir. 1969).
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forceable federal substantive rights. It protects against
discriminatory employment practices on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, national origin,22 or retaliatory action.23
The only other antidiscrimination legislation enacted prior to
1964 was at the state level.2' Congressional efforts, extending back
to the 1940's, were hindered by resistance from the intended targets
of the legislation,2 5 by the lack of agreement regarding standards
which could be used to determine whether discrimination had actually occurred,26 and by the lack of machinery and penalties for successful enforcement.27 But on July 2, 1964, Congress' full frontal
attack on these and other obstacles culminated in the passage of
Title VII, which was signed by President Johnson.2"
Congress viewed Title VII as a sound vehicle "to assure equality
of employment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory
practices and devices which [had] fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens."' 29 However,
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
23. It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any
individual "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by
[Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner
in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII]." Id. § 2000e-3(a).
24. For a review of the development of regulations designed to curb employment discrimination and the difficulties confronted by Congress, see United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, Legislative History of Title VII and XI of Civil Rights Act of 1964
(1977) (summary of prior federal and state responses to employment discrimination prior to
the 1964 Act) [hereinafter cited as Legislative History]; Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered:
The EqualEmployment OpportunityAct of 1972, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 824, 825-30 (1972)
(discussion of executive and congressional treatment of employment discrimination prior to
1964 Act); Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 431, 431-33
(1966) (failure of prior civil rights bills in committee or by filibuster and mounting pressure
for civil rights legislation during the Kennedy administration); Note, EqualEmployment Opportunity Legislation: Study of a Response to a Social Need, 47 DEN. L.J. 521, 521-31 (1970)
(comparison of Colorado Civil Rights Commission with Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission).
25. Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and 1972: A CriticalAnalysis
of the Legislative History and Administration of the Law, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1, 3-5 (1977).
26. Legislative History, supra note 24, at 2.
27. Id.; Sape & Hart, supra note 24, at 826-27.
28. Legislative History, supra note 24, at 11. The provisions of Title VII were reviewed
and debated for 22 days by the House Judiciary Committee, 7 days by the Rules Committee,
6 days by the House and 83 days by the Senate. Id. The major argument against passage was
presented by concerned employers who feared governmental intrusion into the management
of private business. Hill, supra note 25, at 4. See generally Note, Developments in the LawEmployment Discriminationand Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1109, 1113-19 (1971) (discussing the balance of employers' tastes against the need for an
administrable standard for discrimination); Gardiner, The Development of the Meaning of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 23 ALA. L. REV. 451 (1971).
29. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
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instead of opening the courthouse doors for immediate redress of
prohibited practices, Congress created an entirely new remedial
scheme.
Title VII created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to resolve disputes and claims of discriminatory employment practices through informal voluntary agreements and
compliance.3 0 The EEOC has the power to investigate claims and
to promote voluntary conciliation between the employer and the
disgruntled employee.3 1 Title VII was not intended to be the definitive remedy for correcting discriminatory employment practices;
rather, it was "designed to encourage and supplement state and local efforts to eliminate discrimination." 32 To resolve any conflict
and to smooth the relationship between the federal and state efforts,

the drafters compromised with a provision that requires complainants, if they are going to use the Title VII remedy, 3 to initially
resort to existing state procedures. After sixty days, complainants
may employ Title VII procedures regardless of the status of state
34
proceedings.
As originally enacted, Title VII applied to the employment
practices of employers engaged in an industry affecting commerce
with twenty-five or more employees; employment agencies which
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4.
31. Id. § 2000e-5(b). See also Tafoya v. Adams, 612 F. Supp. 1097, 1098 (D. Colo.
1985) (the role of the EEOC is "to investigate charges of discrimination, promote voluntary
conciliation with the requirements of Title VII, and institute civil actions against private
entities engaging in employment discrimination"). The original 1964 provisions were criticized for not granting the EEOC any enforcement powers whatsoever, thus, long, unproductive negotiation sessions ensued with employers who were undeterred by the threat of a
potential lawsuit. Sape & Hart, supra note 24, at 825. As part of the 1972 amendments,
Congress remedied this dilemma by granting the EEOC the power to file suit on behalf of the
aggrieved employee. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (permitting civil action by the EEOC).
32. Berg, EqualEmployment Opportunity Under the Civil RightsAct of 1964, 31 BRooKLYN L. RaV. 62, 67 (1964).
33. Those courts which conclude that Title VII precludes a § 1983 action in the public
sector employment context would require state and local government employees to resort to
state remedial procedures in the first instance, as required by Title VII. See Oscar Mayer &
Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 755-56 (1979) (resort to state remedies required before asserting
Title VII claim). However, § 1983 is an independent remedy which does not require initial
resort to state proceedings. See supranotes 14-20 and accompanying text. See also infra note
138 and accompanying text.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c); Berg, supra note 32, at 68. In the years prior to the adoption
of Title VII, more than half of the states had enacted provisions to encourage equal employment opportunity. There were primarily three types of statutes: (1) those that created an
administrative hearing process and complementary judicial enforcement of any orders made
within that process, (2) those that made employment discrimination a misdemeanor, and (3)
those that set up voluntary conciliation measures without any enforcement provisions. Legislative History, supra note 24, at 5-6.
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bargain with covered employers; and labor organizations with
twenty-five or more members.3" Title VII did not originally apply
to state and local governments.36 These were originally excluded on
the premise that the federal courts were already available to state
and local government employees under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 37 The exclusion required these employees "to resort only to the courts and fight step by step, with all
'38
the expense involved,.., a never-ending ... aggravating battle.
C. The Extension of Title VII to State and Local Government
Employers Through the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972
Congress amended Title VII's enforcement scheme in the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.1 9 Among other changes,"
Congress provided that the administrative remedies available to private sector employees under Title VII should extend to state and
local government employees. 41 This congressional move was motivated, in part, by the findings of several reports examining the extent of discrimination in public sector employment. 42 One report
concluded that "state and local governments have failed to fulfill
their obligation to assure equal job opportunity ....
Not only do
state and local governments consciously and overtly discriminate in
hiring and promoting minority group members, but they do not foster positive programs to deal with discriminatory treatment on the
job."'43 Congress concluded that the only effective means to correct
35. The provisions have since been modified to include employers with 15 or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
36. Id. § 2000e(b), amended by 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b) (1982 & Supp. 1984).
37. Rachlin, Title VII: Limitations and Qualifications,7 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. Rav.
473, 493 (1966).
38. Id. See infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text.
39. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103, amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1972).
40. The 1972 amendments further granted federal enforcement power to the Department of Justice in suits against governments or government agencies, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(1), and also broadened the remedial provisions to allow for a wider range of equitable
relief measures in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). Pub. L. No. 92-26 1, § 2, 86 Stat. 103.
41. This was achieved by expanding the definition of the jurisdiction-defining word
"person" to include "governments, government agencies, [and] political subdivisions." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(a). Congress acted pursuant to its enforcement powers under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 983 (1983).

42. See infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
43. United States Comm'n on Civil Rights, For All the People ... By All the People: A
Report on Equal Opportunity in State and Local Government Employment (1969).
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these practices was to expand the coverage of Title VII.44
Thus, Title VII's scope widened to include police, fire, sanitation, welfare and hospital departments, and boards of education. 45
The number of covered employees increased by an estimated ten
million.' Despite concern over the propriety of conferring the
power to oversee the employment practices of state and local governmental bodies upon a federal agency,47 all "employees subject to
the civil service laws of a state government, government agency, or
political subdivision ' 48 are now protected.
II. THE CONFLICTING CASE LAW
The extension of Title VII protection to state and local government employees seems to have given them a separate and distinct
substantive and remedial avenue for public employment discrimination violations. However, courts disagree over whether the employee may pursue relief under both Title VII and section 1983, or
whether Title VII is now the exclusive applicable remedy.4 9 Due to
the markedly different procedural and substantive requirements between Title VII and section 1983 and their remedies," ° this determination is crucial.
The primary distinction, central to this conflict, is that a claimant proceeding under Title VII must initiate administrative remedies before proceeding to federal district court with his
44. See infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a),(b),(f).
46. Hill, supra note 25, at 52.
47. Senator Ervin placed great emphasis on the undesirability of authorizing a federal
agency to determine the employment policies of states and their political subdivisions:
In my honest judgment, the legislative proposal contained in the bill that the EEOC
be given jurisdiction over the employment practices of all the states and of all the
political subdivisions of all the states constitutes the most drastic assault upon our
Federal system of government which has been proposed in any legislative proposal
to come before Congress at any time in its history.
Sape & Hart, supra note 24, at 847-48 (citing 118 CONG. REc. 707 (1972)).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f).
49. There are other available avenues for remedying various forms of employment discrimination, including the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1982 & Supp. 1983), and The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1982 and Supp.
1983). Each carries its own barrage of statutory provisions, case law gloss, and scholarly
commentary. However, this Note is limited to an analysis of the relationship between Title
VII and § 1983. For a discussion of these and other causes of action in the public sector
employment context, see Note, supra note 20. Even courts which find that Title VII is the
exclusive remedy concede that an independent factual basis may support a section 1983
claim. See infra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 138-94 and accompanying text.
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discrimination claim.51 Yet the claimant who files a section 1983
action based on the same discriminatory action is entitled to immediate federal court jurisdiction. 2 These procedural differences cause
some courts to hesitate when a plaintiff requests judicial determination of a section 1983 claim without first receiving an administrative
determination under Title VII.
A. Title VII As an Exclusive Remedy for Victims of Alleged
Employment Discrimination by State and Local
Government Employers
1. The Tafoya Decision
A number of federal district courts have decreed that state and
local government employees must seek remedy for employment discrimination exclusively through Title VII. 3 One of the most recent
decisions comes from the District Court of Colorado. In Tafoya v.
Adams, 4 the court was presented with a claim from a MexicanAmerican, United States citizen alleging that he was terminated
from his position with the Denver Parks and Recreation Department as retaliation for his prior discrimination complaints to the
EEOC. 55

Prior to bringing his action, Tafoya had obtained a right to sue
letter from the EEOC. 6 In his complaint Tafoya sought relief
under Title VII, section 1983, and section 1981. 57 The district
court dismissed the section 1983 and section 1981 claims on the
grounds that the plaintiff had not demonstrated an independent basis for those claims and therefore Title VII constituted his exclusive
remedy.
The court's rationale was analogous to that of other
59
courts which have deemed Title VII to be an exclusive remedy,
51. See infra notes 140-50 and accompanying text.
52. 42 U.s.C. § 1343(3).
53. E.g., Talley v. City of De Soto, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 375 (N.D. Tex. 1985);
Ratliff v. City of Milwaukee, 608 F. Supp. 1109 (E.D. Wis. 1985); Whiting v. Jackson State
Univ., 606 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1980).
54. 612 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Colo. 1985).
55. Id. at 1098.
56. Id.
57. Id. Section 1981 prohibits discrimination based on race and provides its own remedy to supplement that substantive right. 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
58. Tafoya, 612 F. Supp. at 1103-04. Tafoya's dismissal of the § 1981 claim is clearly
improper in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975). In Johnson, § 1981 was explicitly found to be a separate and
independent remedy from Title VII and thus should be available regardless of the existence of
some "independent basis." 421 U.S. at 461.
59. E.g., Torres v. Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Social Services, 592 F. Supp. 922
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and therefore its decision is the centerpiece for this discussion of
Title VII exclusivity.
2. Bypassing the Administrative Process
The Tafoya court's fundamental concern was with the ability of
an alleged victim of employment discrimination, specifically a state
or local government employee, to bypass the administrative remedial process that Congress had carefully constructed in Title VII. 6
Additionally, "the complainant could obtain remedies and procedural benefits not provided for by Title VII such as punitive damages and a jury trial."6 1 The court found support for its position in
what it considered sufficiently analogous Supreme Court cases:6 2
Brown v. G.S.A. 6 3 and Great American Savings & Loan Association
v. Novotny. 64
In Brown, the Supreme Court considered whether afederal employee could assert job-related racial discrimination claims under
section 1981 instead of pursuing relief under section 717 of Title
VII. 61 Section 71766 is a separate, comprehensive, substantive and
remedial scheme, available only to federal employees, which "establish[es] complementary administrative and judicial enforcement
mechanisms designed to eradicate federal employment discrimination."' 6 7 Based on congressional intent and the elaborate structure
(E.D. Wis. 1984). But see Zewde v. Elgin Community College, 601 F. Supp. 1237 (N.D. Ill.
1984). For discussion regarding the exclusivity of the Title VII administrative process in the
private sector employment context, see Hicks v. ABT Assocs., Inc., 572 F.2d 960, 963-67 (3d
Cir. 1978); Pinson v. Hendrix, 493 F. Supp. 772, 776-77 (N.D. Miss. 1980).
60. Tafoya v. Adams, 612 F. Supp. 1097, 1100 (D. Colo. 1985). See also Day v. Wayne
County Bd. of Auditors, 749 F.2d 1199, 1204 (6th Cir. 1984) (to hold that a plaintiff can
bypass all of the administrative processes of Title VII and go directly into court under § 1983
would be anomalous); Torres, 592 F. Supp. at 928-29.
61. Tafoya, 612 F. Supp. at 1100; LeBoeuf v. Ramsey, 503 F. Supp. 747, 754 n.21 (D.
Mass. 1980), rev'd on other groundssub nom. Costa v. Markey, 677 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1982),
affld on rehearing,706 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983). For further discussion of the differences between Title VII and § 1983 claims, see infra notes 138-94 and accompanying text.
62. Almost every opinion taking the position that Title VII is exclusive in this context
has adopted a similar analysis. See Day, 749 F.2d at 1203; Torres, 592 F. Supp. at 928.
63. 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
64. 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
65. Brown, 425 U.S. at 824-25. The Court found that § 717 was added to Title VII in
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 because of congressional belief that federal
employees did not have an effective judicial remedy for employment discrimination claims.
Ide at 826-28.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 provides that federal employees shall be "made free from any
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id at § 2000e-16(a).
Section 2000e-16's other provisions set forth the procedure through which federal employees
are to bring their claims. Id at § 2000e-16(b)-(c).
67. Brown, 425 U.S. at 831.
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of section 717, the Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he balance,

completeness, and structural integrity of § 717 are inconsistent with
the . . .contention that the judicial remedy afforded by section
717(c) was designed merely to supplement other putative judicial
relief."' 68 Accordingly, the Court would not permit Congress' administrative scheme to be "circumvented by artful pleading '69 and
decreed that section 717 is an exclusive judicial remedy for discrimination claims by federal employees.70
In Novotny, the Supreme Court was presented with the claims of
a private sector employee. The substantive basis of the employee's
complaint was Title VII. 71 Through the remedial device of section
1985(3),72 he contended that he had been injured by a conspiracy to
deprive him of equal protection of, and equal privileges and immunities under, the laws as codified in Title VII.7 3 The Court, echoing
the concerns it expressed in Brown regarding bypass and remedy,74
accordingly concluded that section 1985(3) is unavailable to redress
actions which are substantially violations of Title VII.
A major weakness of Tafoya's analysis is that it relied so heavily
on Brown and Novotny, yet ignored the significant holding of Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. 76 In Johnson, the Supreme
Court held that Title VII is not the exclusive remedy, precluding
section 1981, for private sector employees. 77 Sections 1981 and 1983
68. Id. at 832. But see Brooks, Use of the Civil Rights Acts of1866 and 1871 to Redress
Employment Discrimination,62 CORNELL L. REv. 258, 284-85 (1977) (suggesting that the

Brown decision was based on fiscal considerations; the Court was motivated by the costs of
providing an "extra" remedy).
69. Brown, 425 U.S. at 833.
70. Id. at 835.

71. Novotny's Title VII claim was dismissed by the district court since he was not a
proper plaintiff under § 704(a). Novotny, 442 U.S. at 369.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
73. See id.

74. The Novotny Court demonstrated its concern:
If a violation of Title VII could be asserted through § 1985(3), a complainant could
avoid most if not all of these detailed and specific provisions of the law. Section
1985(3) expressly authorizes compensatory damages; punitive damages might well
follow. The plaintiff or defendant might demand a jury trial. The short and precise
time limitations of Title VII would be grossly altered. Perhaps most importantly,
the complainant could completely bypass the administrative process, which plays
such a crucial role in the scheme established by Congress in Title VII.
Novotny, 442 U.S. at 375-76.
75. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 378.
76. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
77. Id. at 461. "[IThe remedies available under Title VII and under § 1981, although
related, and although directed to most of the same ends, are separate, distinct, and independent." Id
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are closely related statutes,"8 and the Johnson decision is relevant to
the resolution of the section 1983 and Title VII exclusivity issue.
3. Implied CongressionalIntent
The Tafoya court also perceived that the implied congressional
intent 9 underlying Title VII was to make it an exclusive remedy.
The court asserted that the existence of a comprehensive statute
conferring substantive rights and implementing its own remedial
device implies that Congress intends "to supplant any remedy that
otherwise might be available under § 1983." ' s0 The court found that
an analogous rationale was articulated in several Supreme Court
cases which precluded section 1983 actions.8 1
A number of other federal courts have expressed similar deference for this perceived congressional intent. The Sixth Circuit cited
this rationale in Day v. Wayne County Board of Auditors. 2 Also,
the Eastern District Court of Wisconsin concluded in Torres v. Wisconsin Departmentof Health and Social Services that the "sophisticated mechanism" constructed by Congress for remedy of Title8 3VII
claims is the sole avenue available for redress of those claims.
4. The Independent Basis Exception
Many courts which view Title VII as an exclusive remedy recognize an independent basis exception.8 4 Thus, the Tafoya court
78. Sections 1981 and 1983 are often cited simultaneously. See, ag., Tafoya, 612 F.
Supp. at 1098. In the legislative history of the 1972 amendments, §§ 1981 and 1983 were
considered concurrently. See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
79. Tafoya, 612 F. Supp. at 1100-1101.
80. Id at 1100.
81. The Supreme Court has found that § 1983 claims are impliedly preempted where the
alleged state action has also violated another post-section 1983 comprehensive statute which
itself provides an adequate remedy. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (remedies in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., and in the Marine Sea Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of
1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1401 supplant § 1983 remedies); Smith v. Robinson, 104 S. Ct. 3457
(1984) (remedies provided by Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. are
exclusive). See Note, Preclusionof§ 1983 CausesofAction by ComprehensiveStatutory Remedial Schemes, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1183 (1982).
82. 749 F.2d 1199 (6th Cir. 1984). "It can easily be inferred that Congress intended, by
bringing public employment under the Title VII umbrella, to make the comprehensive provisions of that statute the exclusive remedy for violations of its terms." Id at 1204. See also
Meyett v. Coleman, 613 F. Supp. 39 (W.D. Wis. 1985); Storey v. Board of Regents of Univ.
of Wis. Sys., 600 F. Supp. 838, 841 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
83. 592 F. Supp. 922, 930 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
84. See Whiting v. Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1980); Ratliffv. City of
Milwaukee, 608 F. Supp. 1109 (E.D. Wis. 1985); Talley v. City of De Soto, 37 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 375 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
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stated that a state or local government employee may combine Title
VII and section 1983 claims in the same judicial proceeding only
upon demonstrating an independent basis for the section 1983
claim.8" Without such a showing, Title VII thus becomes the only
immediately available judicial remedy.8 6 Although the court did not
define the term "independent basis," it suggested that those factual
allegations which support the Title VII claim cannot be reasserted
to establish violations under section 1981 and section 1983.87 An
independent factual basis alleviates this judicial concern about enlarging the scope of Title VII. 88
Other courts have been less explicit, but also seem prepared to
allow a section 1983 claim to proceed on separate and distinct factual findings. In the words of one court, a section 1983 action will
only be barred "where the plaintiffs' so-called constitutional allegations are so tied up with their cause of action under Title VII that
they are, in the [c]ourt's view, nearly unidentifiable as discrete
claims." 89 In a variation on the exclusivity theme, one court has
even gone so far as to hold that "[a] plaintiff cannot bring an action
under section 1983 based upon Title VII against a person who could
not be sued directly under Title VII." 9
Several courts take the extreme position that, due to substantial
substantive and procedural similarities between Title VII and section 1983 actions, fine distinctions regarding an independent basis
85. Tafoya, 612 F. Supp. at 1102. See Green v. Illinois Dep't of Trans., 609 F. Supp.
1021, 1027-28 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (plaintiff's claim dismissed to the extent that it realleged a
violation of Title VII).
86. Tafoya, 612 F. Supp. at 1103.
87. Id. at 1102-03. See also Day v. Wayne County Bd. of Auditors, 749 F.2d 1199, 1204
(6th Cir. 1984); Talley, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 376.
88. Huebschen v. Dep't of Health and Social Services, 716 F.2d 1167, 1170 (7th Cir.
1983). See Day, 749 F.2d at 1204.
89. Torres v. Wisconsin Dep't of Health and Social Services, 592 F. Supp. 922, 930
(E.D. Wis. 1984).
90. Huebschen, 716 F.2d at 1170. The court wanted to ensure that the plaintiff was not
simply avoiding the Title VII process by using the remedial device of § 1983 and claiming as
substantive violations the rights set forth in Title VII. If the right sued upon under § 1983 is
itself a right secured by Title VII, which contains its own detailed remedial provisions a suit
under § 1983 to vindicate that particular right "may well be barred." Storey v. Board of
Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 600 F. Supp. 838, 841 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
In Maine v. Thiboutot, the Supreme Court found that § 1983 protected against state action which violated the Constitution and other federal laws. 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1979). Thus,
those federal statutes which have their own remedial provisions, would probably satisfy the
independent basis requirement as set out by Trigg. But see Rivera v. City of Wichita Falls,
665 F.2d 531, 534 n.4 (5th Cir. 1982) ("Consideration of [§ 1981 and § 1983] remedies for
employment discrimination is necessary only if their violation can be made out on grounds
different from those available under Title VII.").
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are essentially irrelevant. 91 Claims based on sections 1981 and 1983
have been described as "superfluous" on the grounds that "[n]o
greater or lesser protection against discriminatory practices is provided" by them. 92 Thus, it may simply be more appropriate to try
the claim under Title VII.9 3 This interpretation assumes that Title
VII encompasses section 1983 and therefore extends constitutional
protections to state and local government employees. 94
B.

Title VII As the Nonexclusive Complement of Section 1983

1. The Trigg Decision
The recent Seventh Circuit decision, Trigg v. Fort Wayne Community Schools,95 exemplifies the opposing viewpoint. The plaintiff
in Trigg contended that she had been released from her employment
by the Fort Wayne Community Schools because of her race and sex
in violation of the fourteenth amendment and brought suit under
section 1983.96 The district court characterized her claim as arising
solely under the provisions of Title VII and accordingly dismissed
her case since she had not initiated the administrative hearing requirements of Title VII. 97
Reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit found that "the
Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII have granted public sector
employees independent rights to be free of employment discrimination." 98 The court primarily relied on two rationales. First, state
and local government employees had a right to sue under section
1983 to remedy employment discrimination long before Title VII
was enacted. 99 Secondly, the court found that the legislative history
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which ex91. Actually, there are significant differences between Title VII and § 1983. See infra
notes 138-94 and accompanying text.
92. Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722, 729 (2d Cir. 1976). See Day, 749 F.2d at
1204; Rose v. Eastern Neb. Human Serv. Agency, 510 F. Supp. 1343, 1355 (D. Neb. 1981).
93. Firefighters Inc. for Racial Equality v. Bach, 731 F.2d 664, 666 n.2 (10th Cir. 1984).
94. Trigg, Brief for Appellee at 24.
95. 766 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1985). A number of courts have determined without analysis
that Title VII is not an exclusive remedy and have allowed plaintiff to proceed simultaneously
with Title VII and § 1983 claims. Hamilton v. Rodgers, 783 F.2d 1306 (1986); Lewis v.
University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910 (1983); Garner v. Giarrusso, 571 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir.
1978). Other courts have allowed § 1983 claims to proceed alone without considering the
exclusivity issue. Jackson v. City of Akron, 411 F. Supp. 680 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Roche v.
Foulger, 404 F. Supp. 705 (D. Utah 1975).
96. Trigg 766 F.2d at 300.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 302.
99. Id.
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tended Title VII to state and local government employees, evidenced a congressional intent to retain section 1983 as a remedy for
employment discrimination in the public sector context) °° The
court concluded that the plaintiff could sue her state government
employer for violations of the fourteenth amendment through section 1983 and avoid Title VII's remedial scheme, even though the
facts suggested a violation of Title VII.''
In the Trigg decision, the Seventh Circuit echoed the views of
other courts. 10 2 In one case, the district court permitted the plaintiff
to pursue relief under both Title VII and section 1983 even though
she had failed to file a discrimination claim with the EEOC. 10 3 The
court reasoned that the individual claims were governed by their
own procedural rules." ° Another court has permitted a section
1983 claim to proceed where a claimant had filed his Title VII action with the EEOC, but commenced the section 1983 suit before
receiving his right to sue notice, "since his right to sue under [sec05
tion 1983] was unaffected by Title VII requirements."'1 Yet another court has permitted a plaintiff to pursue a section 1983 claim,
despite a possibility that the plaintiffs claim may have been more
"appropriately forwarded" under Title VII, because of its belief that
06
Title VII does not pre-empt section 1983 actions.'
2. Distinguishing Brown and Novotny
To persuasively support its holding that Title VII is not an exclusive remedy, the Trigg court squarely faced both the Brown v.
G.S.A.' °7 and Great American Savings & Loan Association v.
100.

Id.
101. Id.
102. See Daisernia v. New York, 582 F. Supp. 792, 795 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); Skadegaard v.
Farrell, 578 F. Supp. 1209, 1218 (D.N.J. 1984); Curran v. Portland Superintending School
Comm., 435 F. Supp. 1063, 1082 (D. Me. 1977). One case, decided before the 1972 amendments, determined that there was no irreconcilable conflict between the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and either § 1983 or § 1985(3), so that one action did not preclude the others. Johnson
v. City of Cincinnati, 450 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1971).
103. Morgan v. Sharon, Penn. Bd. of Educ., 472 F. Supp. 1157, 1158-59 (N.D. Pa. 1979).
104. Id. at 1159 n.1 ("Congress . .. did not make the remedies under Title VII and
Section 1983 mutually exclusive. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to pursue relief under both
counts, with each count governed by its own procedural standards.").
105. Wells v. Hutchinson, 499 F. Supp. 174, 189 (E.D. Tex. 1980). The court also noted
that the plaintiff's later filing of his Title VII claim was proper in that it was made after the
receipt of his right to sue letter regardless of the existence of prior assertions under § 1983.
Id.
106. Ford v. Jones, 372 F. Supp. 1187, 1190 (E.D. Ky. 1974).
107. 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
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Novotny "I opinions, which found exclusivity in related circumstances.' 0 9 The Trigg court distinguished Brown on its facts. The
plaintiff in Brown was a federal employee who could have sought
relief under section 717 of Title VII'° but instead proceeded under
section 1981."' Prior to the 1972 amendments, Title VII did not

encompass federal employees," 2 and there was no effective remedy
available." 3 Thus, the Court inferred that Congress did intend to
establish an exclusive discrimination remedy for federal employees
under section 717.11 But the Seventh Circuit maintained that state
and local government employees had a previously existing right
under section 1983 which Congress intended to supplement, rather

than to supplant.
Novotny involved a private sector employee's suit under section
1985, a remedial statute similar to section 1983. Novotny had no
substantive basis, other than Title VII, upon which to base his section 1985 claim." 5 The plaintiff in Trigg, however, was a state government employee who could use the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause as an independent substantive basis for her section
1983 claim." 6 As the Trigg court noted, "two Justices in the
Novotny majority wrote separately to suggest that Mr. Novotny's
employment discrimination claim based on § 1985(3) would have
been legally sufficient if he could have asserted Constitutional
108. 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
109. See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16.
111. Brown, 425 U.S. at 821-25.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, as amended by Pub. L. No. 92-261, § I1 (1972).
113. Brown, 425 U.S. at 825-26.
114. Trigg, 766 F.2d at 301. See also Curran v. Portland Superintending School Comm.,
435 F. Supp. 1063, 1082 (D. Me. 1977). The Curran court noted that
[i]n extending the coverage of Title VII to State and local government employees,
Congress merely deleted the exemption of these workers previously contained in the
statute.... This. . .contrasts with the remedial scheme set forth in Section 717,
which the Court in Brown found to have established a comprehensive system of
administrative and judicial remedies for federal employment discrimination and to
constitute a balanced and complete whole totally independent of the earlier provisions of Title VII dealing with private employees.
Id.
115. Trigg, 766 F.2d at 301.
116. The fourteenth amendment also compelled Ms. Trigg to further demonstrate unlawful state action upon which to base her § 1983 claim. Trigg, 766 F.2d at 301. See also Skadegaard v. Farrell, 578 F. Supp. 1209, 1218 (D.N.J. 1984). "The plaintiff in Novotny was
precluded from asserting similar claims under the Fourteenth Amendment because he was
employed by a private employer. No state action was involved in that case. Here, by virtue of
plaintiff Skadegaard's state employment, she had additional and independent rights vis-a-vis
her employer which she has asserted." Trigg, 766 F.2d at 301.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:519

violations." 1' 17
Further, Novotny's asserted right under Title VII did not even
exist prior to the enactment of Title VII since there were no previous private sector employment discrimination laws. 1 8 However,
the right invoked by the plaintiff in Trigg predated Title VII, and, as
the court noted, "Title VII could not have impliedly repealed any
previously existing rights."11' 9 Novotny was unhesitatingly distinguished on these bases. 120
3. Legislative History: Express CongressionalIntent and the
Johnson Decision
Congressional intent was one of Trigg's principle justifications
for finding that Title VII is not an exclusive remedy. The court
reasoned that Congress, in enacting the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, did not intend to implicitly repeal section 1983
or other avenues available to assert employment discrimination
claims. 21 The Seventh Circuit cited to legislative history which
specifically supports this interpretation.
[T]he Committee wishes to emphasize that the individual's right
to file a civil action in his own behalf, pursuant to the Civil
Rights Act of 1870 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, is in
no way affected .... Title VII was envisioned as an independent
statutory authority meant to provide an aggrieved individual
with an additional remedy to redress employment discrimination .... The bill, therefore, by extending jurisdiction to State
and local government employees does not affect existing rights
that such 122
individuals have already been granted by previous
legislation.
Other courts have also found evidence of congressional intent
persuasive enough to support a conclusion that Title VII is not exclusive. 123 As one court observed, "[I]t is clearly Congress' prerog117. Trigg, 766 F.2d at 301-02 (referring to Novotny, 442 U.S. at 380-81 (Powell, J., concurring), and 442 U.S. at 384-85 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
118. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 376-77.
119. Trigg, 766 F.2d at 302.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 301.
122. Id. at 301 n.3 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), reprintedin
1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2137, 2154).
123. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-52 (1971) (finding that a private
sector employee's right to trial de novo under Title VII was not foreclosed by prior claim
submission to final arbitration under a nondiscrimination clause of a collective bargaining
agreement, the Court asserted that "[t]he clear inference is that Title VII was designed to
supplement rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment discrimination"); Zewde v. Elgin Community College, 601 F. Supp. 1237, 1247 (N.D. IM.1984).
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ative to provide overlapping and duplicative remedial statutory
schemes if it chooses." '24 Courts may not inquire into Congressional intent unless "Congress has not articulated its position on the
'
exclusivity of the remedies it has created."125
Since legislative history indicates an explicit intent to leave existing remedies intact,
1 26
Title VII does not supplant section 1983 in any way.
The significance of legislative history in this area is underscored
by the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., which held that Title VII does not preclude suit under
section 1981.127 There, the statute of limitations had tolled on a
discrimination suit filed by a private sector employee under Title
VII. The Court was asked to determine whether the employee's
section 1981 claim, which was based on the same factual allegations
as his extinct Title VII claim, was tolled by a timely filing of that
Title VII claim.1 2 1 In concluding that the limitations period did not
toll, 129 the Court explicitly recognized the independence of section

1981 in relation to Title VII. The Court used congressional intent to
justify its conclusion, citing legislative history and taking specific
note of the fact that the "Senate rejected an amendment that would
have deprived a claimant of any right to sue under § 198 l."13I Furthermore, the Court found that, although the remedies available
under section 1981 are coextensive with Title VII, "they augment
each other and are not mutually exclusive." '3 1 Thus, the Court
conceded that a choice of forums is possible and concluded that
"the remedies available under Title VII and under section 1981,
although related, and ... directed to most of the same ends, are
'
separate, distinct, and independent." 132
Consequently, Title VII
does not limit the availability of section 1981.133 The analogy to
124.
1985).
125.
126.
127.

Storey v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 600 F. Supp. 838, 840 (W.D. Wis.
Id.
Id
421 U.S. 454 (1975). See also Zevde, 601 F. Supp. at 1246; Storey, 600 F. Supp. at

841.
128. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 457.
129. Id. at 462-67.
130. Id. at 459. See infra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
131. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971),
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2154).
132. Id at 461. Those courts that view Title VII as an exclusive remedy are generally
quick to distinguish Johnson on the grounds that the employee involved in that case was from
the private sector. Eg., Brown v. G.S.A., 425 U.S. 820, 833-34 (1976).
133. See Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 166 (7th Cir. 1976);
Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Reese, 507 F.2d 607, 610 (5th Cir. 1975); Swicker v. William
Armstrong & Sons, 484 F. Supp. 762, 769 (E.D. Pa. 1980).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:519

section 1983 is clear.
4. A Different Independent Basis Requirement
Some courts which hold that Title VII is not exclusive may still
require an independent basis for plaintiff's section 1983 claim.
However, this requirement is fundamentally different from that demanded by those courts which interpret Title VII as an exclusive
remedy.1 34 The Tafoya court, which subscribed to exclusivity, held
that the section 1983 claim could not be pursued because the facts
supporting it were "inherently bound up" with the Title VII
claim.' 3 5 The independent basis suggested by Trigg, however, is
substantive rather than factual; therefore, Ms. Trigg's fourteenth
amendment section 1983 claim survived.' 36 Under this approach,
VII and section 1983 claims
the plaintiff may support both Title
37
with the same factual allegations.
III.

THE RAMIFICATIONS OF EXCLUSIVITY

There are major procedural, substantive, and remedial differences between Title VII and section 1983 claims in the state and
local government employment context. Thus, judicial determinations regarding whether or not Title VII is exclusive bring significant consequences for state and local government employees.
Although many courts have asserted that all aspects of a Title VII
claim parallel those of a section 1983 claim,138 such statements are
39
inaccurate. 1
A. A Procedural Comparison of Section 1983 and Title VII.
Section 1983 Provides Immediate JudicialAccess
A section 1983 plaintiff who is permitted to proceed independently from his Title VII claim is in an advantageous procedural
position. Under section 1983, the plaintiff is not required to resort
to state administrative remedies prior to commencing judicial ac134. See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
135. Tafoya v. Adams, 612 F. Supp. 1097, 1102 (D. Colo. 1985).
136. Trigg v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 766 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1985).
137. Id.
138. Lewis v. University of Pittsburgh, 725 F.2d 910, 915 n.5 (1983); Rivera v. City of
Wichita Falls, 665 F.2d 531, 534 n.4 (5th Cir. 1982); Wintz v. Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey, 551 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
139. See infra notes 140-94 and accompanying text; see also Noble, Civil Rights---An
Analysis of Section 1983 and Title VII1 A Comparative Strategy, 23 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 49
(1979).

19861

TITLE VII AS A REMEDY

tion. 140 This is a significant advantage, since a Title VII claimant
must initiate available state and local remedial procedures before
approaching the EEOC.1 4 '
Even after a claimant has fulfilled the requirements to commence a Title VII action, he may not proceed directly to court. Instead, Title VII claims are initially evaluated by the EEOC.'4 2 The
EEOC enforces substantive rights granted under Title VII by conciliatory measures and the art of persuasion. The five-member
EEOC "[does] not carry a club."' 4 3 It can only investigate, conciliate, or mediate and has no direct erforcement power.'"
If the EEOC dismisses the complaint, 4 ' it notifies the claimant

with a "right to sue" letter. 14 6 The claimant may not seek judicial
resolution until he receives this notice. 147
140. Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). The Supreme Court has recognized that where the claimant
fails to initiate his state's remedial mechanisms and instead files directly with the EEOC, the
EEOC can take measures to initiate the state's mechanisms. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S.
522, 525 (1972).
However, the claimant is not required to exhaust state and local administrative remedies,
nor to file an action in state court. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5. See generally Catania,State Employment DiscriminationRemedies and PendentJurisdiction Under Title VIL Access to Federal
Courts, 32 AM. U.L. REv. 777, 818-19 (1983). The claimant must at all times comply with
restrictive filing deadlines. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
143. 110 CONG. RFc. 14,188 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey during congressional
debates on role of the EEOC in Title VII enforcement). Ultimate enforcement responsibility
rests with the federal courts. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
144. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 & 5. If the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe the
truth of the unlawful discrimination charge then it is to "endeavor to eliminate any such
alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion." Id. If the EEOC does not find reasonable cause to believe that the charge is
true within 120 days of filing, it must dismiss the claim. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
145. Also, if it fails to act on it within 180 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
146. The EEOC is authorized to bring civil suit against the respondent. Id § 2000e5(f)(1). Where the respondent is a government or government agency, the Attorney General
is authorized to file suit. Id.
Title VII has a built-in protective device which permits individuals to intervene in suits
brought on their behalf by the EEOC. Id Thus, the claimant can insure that his interests
will be considered by the court and he can further request any additional relief which he feels
should be sought. See 19 DuQ. L. RFv. 589, 595-96 (1981).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The claimant can demand issuance of his right to sue
letter after 180 days from the filing date of his charge. Id. § 2000e-5. See Ostapowicz v.
Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 398 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
However, "filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional
prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is
subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling." Zipes v. TWA, 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982).
See also Jauvitis, Sidesteppingthe E.E.O.C: GrantingPreliminaryInjunctive Relief to Private
Plaintiffs, 9 EMPLOY. REL. L.J. 485 (1984); Comment, EEOC-Filing of Discrimination
Charges with the EEOC- Statute ofLimitations or JurisdictionalPrerequisite?,27 HOWARD
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The Title VII claimant operates under the strict time frames
contained in Title VII and is usually required to file within 180 days
of the alleged unlawful employment practices. 148 In contrast, the
plaintiff's section 1983 claim is governed by his state's statute of
limitations, which is likely to be much less restrictive--especially 14in9
light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Wilson v. Garcia.
Since Congress did not provide for a statute of limitations within
section 1983, the state's personal injury statute of limitations is
controlling. 150
B. Section 1983 Has More Rigorous Substantive Requirements
Than Title VII
The substantive elements of a section 1983 claim are clearly
more difficult to meet than those of Title VII. First, the section
1983 plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant acted
under color of state law in depriving the plaintiff of his federal
rights-a requirement that is entirely absent from Title VII.151 Section 1983 does not protect individuals from purely private conduct 5 2 or actions of federal officials, 15 3 unless they are acting in
conjunction with state officials or pursuant to local custom, law, or
L.J. 543 (1984). This Note addresses a different issue: whether the claimant is required to
commence proceedings with the EEOC under Title VII to the exclusion of pursuing a § 1983
claim.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). The claimant must usually file his charge within 180 days of
the alleged unlawful employment practice. Id. This timely filing requirement, however, has
not been strictly observed, "[r]ather, the courts have applied traditional doctrines of equity to
modify inflexible time periods in order to better serve the broad remedial purposes of the
Act." Comment, Civil Rights-EqualEmployment Opportunity-Statuteof Limitationsfor Filing a Charge with the EEOCIs Not Tolledfor the Periodan Employee Seeks Relief Through a
Company's Greivance Procedures, 47 Miss. L.J. 545, 557 (1976).
149. 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985). The Wilson Court held that § 1983 actions are characterized
as personal injury actions for determining the appropriate state statute of limitations. Id at
1947-49. In that case, the New Mexico three-year statute of limitations for personal injuries
applied. Id. at 1949. Predictably, the aftermath of this decision has brought forth conflicting
opinions as to precisely which statute will apply in each state. CompareShorters v. Chicago,
617 F. Supp. 661 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (Illinois five-year broad residual statute of limitations applies), with Gates v. Spinks, 771 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 106 S. Ct. 1378 (1986)
(Mississippi one-year personal injury statute of limitations applies).
i50. Wilson v. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985) (federal law governs characterization of
§ 1983 causes of action and that characterization is one of personal injury actions for statute
of limitations purposes). See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
151. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
152. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 678. See Horowitz, The Misleading
Searchfor "State Action" under the FourteenthAmendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REv. 208 (1957);
Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEx. L. REv. 347 (1963).
153. Stonecipher v. Bray, 653 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145
(1982); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1980).
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regulations.1

Title VII creates and protects its own set of substantive rights:
freedom from employment discrimination on the basis of race,

color, religion, sex, national origin, or retaliatory action.' 5 5 However, the section 1983 plaintiff must allege that the defendant has
deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States.' 56 Although there is some reason to doubt the continued vitality of its holding, the Supreme Court decreed in Maine v.

Thiboutot 57 that section 1983 protects statutory as well as constitutional rights. This decision has since been severely restricted; 158
however, the Supreme Court has not explicitly reversed its decision.
The section 1983 plaintiff who claims the fourteenth amendment
as the substantive basis of his claim must prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that the defendant engaged in intentional discriminatory practices, 5 9 because the equal protection clause extends
only to disparate treatment.'60 Although the Title VII plaintiff may
154. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 681.
155. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3(a).
156. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536 (1974); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S.
144, 150 (1970). Through § 1983, constitutional protections against discrimination based on
race, color, sex, religion, national origin, age, handicaps, physical attributes, sexual preferences, grooming, and alienage can be asserted. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supranote 41, at
685. There is a limitation of alienage discrimination prohibition where the position involved is
bound up with the operation of the states as government entities. Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. 68 (1979).
157. 448 U.S. 1 (1980). The Court gave some guidance for determining which federal
statutes are covered in PennhurstState School v. Halderman,451 U.S. 1 (1981) (suggesting
inclusion of those which (1) have not been intended by Congress to foreclose § 1983 remedies,
and those which (2) create rights, privileges, or immunities). Those courts which hold that
Title VII is an exclusive remedy find support in their belief that § 1983 plaintiffs are simply
asserting Title VII's substantive statutory rights through § 1983. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
159. Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
239 (1976) (cases based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment require a
demonstration of discriminatory purpose or intent). There is some doubt as to the validity of
this requirement. See Note, supra note 20, at 954-55.
Once a prima facie case is made, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to
articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. Whiting v.
Jackson State Univ., 616 F.2d 116, 122 (1980); S. AGID, FAIR EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION:
PROVING AND DEFENDING ATITLE VII CASE 188 (1979). If the defendant is successful, the

burden implicitly returns to the plaintiff to show that the legitimate rationale asserted by the
defendant is only a mere pretext for his engaging in employment practices. Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978).
160. "It remains to be seen whether, in employment cases where there is an extreme
statistical disparity revealing a significant under-representation of a protected class, the line
between discriminatory impact and purpose will in fact disappear." S. AGID, supra note 159,
at 189.
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proceed under a theory of disparate treatment if he can prove in162
tent, 161 he also has the options of showing either disparate impact
(discriminatory effects without intent) or present effects of past
discrimination.
The disparate treatment theory demands a showing of discriminatory intent on the part of the employer.1 63 Disparate treatment
can either be based on discriminatory pattern and practice 1" or on
165
evidence of reprisal or retaliation.
The Title VII claimant, however, may avoid the burden of
showing intent and instead show disparate impact or effect. 1 66 This
theory applies where the respondent uses a facially neutral non-job
related employment practice which disproportionately affects a protected Title VII classification in hiring, promotion, and other employment decisions.1 67 Intent is not an element of disparate impact
because "Congress was concerned with the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation."' 6 8
The Title VII claimant's third option is to demonstrate present
effects of past discrimination, where an employment related practice
161. To prove disparate treatment, the claimant must demonstrate that he has been
treated less favorably than his peers on the basis of one of the enumerated classes set forth in
Title VII. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In order to make a
showing of a prima facie case of employment discrimination under this theory, the plaintiff
must show that: (1) he belongs to a protected group, (2) he was sufficiently qualified for the
position which he sought, (3) he was in fact denied that position, and (4) the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants. Id.
162. "The circuit courts have held, without exception, that the Griggs [v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)] standard will apply in suits against governmental defendants," and
therefore disparate impact is sufficient to support a Title VII claim. Note, supra note 49, at
993. See Jacobs, A ConstitutionalRoute to DiscriminatoryImpactStatutory Liabilityfor State
and Local Government Employers: All Roads Lead to Rome, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 301 (1980).
163. Williams v. City of New Orleans, 543 F. Supp. 662, 672 (1982). The plaintiff does
not have to demonstrate actual subjective intent to discriminate, only that the respondent
knows that a specific practice, which is allegedly discriminatory, actually exists. See Sape &
Hart, supra note 24, at 884.
164. Thus, the employee may show that the employer has intended to conduct systematic
disparate treatment as a standard labor procedure. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 307 (1977).
165. Thus, the employee may show that he has been intentionally discriminated against
because of his prior assertion of Title VII claims and/or participation in the equal employment opportunity process. See Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 1980). Once the
claimant demonstrates disparate treatment the burden shifts to the respondent employer to
show a justified business purpose for carrying on the intentional discriminatory actions. Texas
Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-56 (1981).
166. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
167. Catania, supra note 141, at 786.
168. Richey, Manual on Employment Discrimination Law and Civil Rights Actions in
Federal Courts, A-11 (1984).

TITLE VII AS A REMEDY

19861

"perpetuates discriminatory practices that took place prior to the
passage of Title VII."'1 69 This theory is often the basis of attacks on
seniority systems.

1 70

As a final substantive hurdle, the section 1983 plaintiff must
overcome any claims to official immunity. 171 In a section 1983 action, as opposed to a Title VII action, the plaintiff cannot proceed
directly against the state because of eleventh amendment sovereign
immunity, but must proceed against the state's officials, unless the
state has consented to be a defendant.172 However, this prohibition
does not extend to municipal corporations or other political subdivisions, sometimes including local school boards. 17 3 Thus, municipalities and other local governmental units can be sued under
section 1983 for constitutional deprivations where the allegedly unlawful action "implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by
that body's officers."' 174
C. Section 1983 Offers Remedial Advantages over Title VII
If the section 1983 plaintiff does make the substantive showings
of color of law and discriminatory intent, his available remedies are
more expansive than those available under Title VII.'7 5 This is another advantage of the section 1983 action. The major remedial difference between the two statutes is that section 1983 entitles a
169. It at A-10.
170. Title VII allows an employer to distinguish between employees on the basis of a
"bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or
quality of production or to employees who work in different locations," or "to act upon
results of any professionally developed ability test," provided that such distinctions are not
made with an intent to discriminate. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
171. Official immunity doctrines have been generally based on concerns that (1) it would
be unjust to subject officers, who are required to make discretionary decisions as part of their
job, to such liability; and that (2) this threat of personal liability would hinder the officer's
ability to make proper decisions in light of the public good. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
240 (1974).
172. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978).
173. Owens v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637-44 (1980); Mount Healthy Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977). See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693,
717-21 (1973).
174. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). The Supreme
Court reversed Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), finding that local governments are immune from suit under § 1983 and that municipalities and other local governmental units are
"persons" under § 1983 and may therefore be liable for both equitable and monetary relief.
436 U.S. at 690.
175. The intended purpose of § 1983 remedies is to compensate persons for injuries
caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978).
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plaintiff to recover punitive 17 6 and compensatory damages,' 77 including those for mental and emotional distress. 178 The court's full
range of injunctive and equitable powers is available to remedy section 1983 violations.1 79 The court may grant back pay awards beyond the two-year limitation period provided for in Title VIIO80 and
attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiff "unless special circumstances would render an award unjust."' 18 1
If the claimant successfully demonstrates a violation of Title
VII's provisions, the remedies available to him are somewhat limited. 8 2 The Title VII claimant is not entitled to compensatory or
punitive damages, 8 ' which must be authorized under some other
statute such as section 1983.184 Under Title VII, the court may
award back pay,1 85 which includes lost salary and overtime, shift
pay differential, and fringe benefits, 186 attorneys' fees, or other equitable relief.' 8 7 Back pay awards under Title VII are limited to the
two years prior to the action, whereas there is no such restriction
with an award under section 1983.188
176. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 35 (1983) (citing Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22
(1980)). See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 233 (1970) (Brennan, J.concurring)
(standard for award of punitive damages); 13 U. BALT. L. Rv.187 (1983). Punitive damages will also be available if the § 1983 action is joined with a Title VII action. Bradshaw,
569 F.2d at 1068. However, punitive damages are not available against municipalities. City
of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
177. Carey, 435 U.S. at 256-57.
178. Noble, supra note 139, at 77; Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979).
179. Richey, supra note 168, at D2-13.
180. "In the individual case, liability commences from the date of the discriminatory
conduct, regardless of whether suit is brought under Title VII or one of the other statutes."
Reiss, Requiem for an "Independent Remedy" The Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1871 as
Remedies for Employment Discrimination,50 S.CAL. L. Rnv. 961, 1024 (1977). In contrast,
Title VII limits damages to the two years prior to EEOC filing. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
181. Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968). Attorney's fees awards
are recoverable pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988. Id. The Supreme Court has held that attorney's fees can even be awarded against
states despite the eleventh amendment. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
182. This is one of Title VII's major drawbacks. Platte, Employment Discrimination
Causes of Action: Alternatives to Title VII, 57 FLA. B.J. 545, 545 (1983).
183. Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 926-28 (3d Cir. 1977); EEOC v. Detroit Edison
Co., 515 F.2d 301, 308-10 (6th Cir. 1975).
184. Bradshaw v. Zoological Society, 569 F.2d 1066, 1068 (9th Cir. 1978).
185. However, there is a major limitation placed on awards of back pay in that they are
limited to the two-year period immediately preceeding the fling of the charge of discrimination with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
186. Willett v. Emory & Henry College, 427 F. Supp. 631, 635 (W.D. Va. 1977), affidper
curiam, 569 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1978).
187. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
188. See supra note 179 and accompanying text. Some commentators have concluded
that, due to the severe substantive and procedural hurdles that a § 1983 plaintiff must over-
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Another advantage for a section 1983 plaintiff is the possibility
of a jury trial, if he is claiming non-equitable damages. Thus, a seetion 1983 plaintiff who seeks punitive and compensatory damages
will be permitted a jury trial' 89 but is not entitled to one when he
only seeks equitable relief such as back pay or reinstatement. 190
The Title VII claimant is not entitled to a jury trial, 19 1 unless his
Title VII claim is joined with an action which permits jury determi-

nation of issues common to both claims. 192

The equitable remedies available under both statutes are similar.
Each allows declaratory and injunctive relief, including reinstate193
ment and promotions, and other specific forms of equitable relief.

The Title VII claimant can receive an injunction prohibiting the
unlawful discriminatory practice. 194
D.

The Role of Res Judicata

Finally, the role of resjudicatain the exclusivity conflict merits
consideration. Resjudicata,or claim preclusion, is a doctrine which
holds that a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes
both the parties and their privies from relitigating, at any time,
those causes of action which were actually litigated.' 95 Collateral
estoppel, or issue preclusion, dictates that issues litigated and decided in a prior action that culminated in a judgment on the merits,
cannot be relitigated by those same parties, even if the subsequent
come, Title VII actually provides the more effective and reliable vehicle for confronting and
remedying discriminatory practices in state and local government. S.AGID, supra note 159,
at 192; Brooks, supra note 68, at 268-69. While Title VII may offer procedural advantages,
this does not justify exclusivity, especially since Congress did not intend for Title VII to be
the exclusive remedy. See infra notes 219-38 and accompanying text.
189. Noble, supra note 139, at 79. Accord Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974).
190. Moore v. Sun Oil Co., 636 F.2d 154, (6th Cir. 1980); Saad v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs.,
Inc., 456 F. Supp. 33 (D.D.C. 1978); Richey, supra note 168, at D3-1 & 12.
191. See Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969).
192. Bibbs v. Jim Lynch Cadillac, 653 F.2d 316 (8th Cir. 1981) (§ 1981 claims joined
with Title VII claims). See Case Comment, Right to Jury Trial in Suitsfor Back Pay: Title
VII or § 1981, 12 MEM. ST. L. REv. 355 (1982).
193. Richey, supra note 168, at A-53-54 (Title VII) & D2-13 (§ 1983).
194. Id. at A-52. For the most part, the trial judge has wide discretion in utilizing his
remedial powers.
195. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE,
§ 4402 (1981). See Schwartz, Res Judicatain Actions under42 U.S.C § 1983, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 384, 384 (1984) (analyzing Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465
U.S. 75 (1984)). The possible differences between potentially identical claims and issues include different "facts, subject matter, periods of time, case law, statutes, procedural protections, notions of public interest [and] the qualification of tribunals." 4 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 59 (2d ed. 1983).
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1 96
suit arises out of a different cause of action.
Any time that a state or local government employee invokes Title VII, that employee will be required to exhaust the procedural
requirements of Title VII before proceeding with a judicial suit.19 7
There is some possibility that this will lead to preclusion of a subsequent section 1983 action. In Kremer v. Chemical Construction
Co., 198 the Supreme Court held that a judgment in state court, on
review of a prior administrative hearing which adjudicated a state
law claim identical to the elements of a Title VII claim, must receive full faith and credit in federal court and bars a subsequent
Title VII filing.199
However, resjudicatadoes not apply to unreviewed state administrative determinations.2 °° Resjudicata also does not apply where
the claimant has previously pursued his grievance to final arbitration under a nondiscrimination clause of a collective bargaining
agreement. 0 1 Of course, if a court dismisses a section 1983 claim
for reasons not on the merits, the resjudicata doctrine is not activated and does not bar eventual commencement of a Title VII action.2 °2 Some courts which find Title VII nonexclusive have found
a subsequent Title VII action permissible even where a prior suit
has occurred, or is proceeding concurrently, under other civil rights

196. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597-98 (1948).
197. Although a claimant may not have fully exhausted the requirements of Title VII, at
least one court would permit him to proceed with the civil action in federal district court if
that court's competing-concerns analysis weighed in his favor. The analysis considers: (1)
the existence of potential irreparable harm to the claimant, (2) whether failure to act would
cause a permanent foreclosure of adequate relief, and (3) whether the EEOC's case load precludes the granting of preliminary relief. Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 N. Calif. Counties Joint
Apprenticeship & Training Comm., 440 F. Supp. 506, 516 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
198. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
199. Id. "Such [state] Acts, records and judicial proceedings ... shall have the same full
faith and credit in every court within the United States. . . as they have by law or usage in
the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738 (1982 & Supp. 1983). Section 1738 controls whenever there was an opportunity for a
full and fair hearing which satisfies fourteenth amendment due process. Kremer v. Chemical
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 476 (1982). See also Catania, Access to the Federal Courtsfor
Title VII Claimants in the Post-KremerEra: Keeping the Doors Open, 16 Loy. U. Cm. LJ.
209 (1985); Note, Res Judicata, CollateralEstoppel, and Title VII: Tool or Trap for the Unwary?, 62 NEB. L. REv. 384 (1983).
200. Schwartz, supra note 195, at 387; Catania, supra note 141, at 779 n.9.
201. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974).
202. However, a Title VII action may be barred if the claimant has had the opportunity
to intervene in an EEOC action on his behalf and he has failed to do so. Duquesne, supra
note 146, at 596. The EEOC's action may likewise be barred if it parallels a private suit that
is already pending. The EEOC's right to sue terminates when the claimant files his own
action. At that point the EEOC may exercise its right to intervene. EEOC v. Cronin, 370 F.
Supp. 579, 580 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
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statutes, due to the fact that the plaintiff had not yet received a right
to sue notice from the EEOC and thus could not have invoked Title
VII in the prior action.20 3
If a court subscribes to the view that Title VII is not exclusive,
then other res judicata considerations are present. Courts have
found that a prior civil rights action under section 1983 will not bar
a subsequent claim under Title VII. 2° But in Harrington v.
Vandalia Butler Bd. of Ed., the Sixth Circuit held that a judgment
in a Title VII action will bar a subsequent action under section
1983.20 However, this includes only judicial Title VII judgments
and not the EEOC's finding that a violation has occurred.20 6 Preclusion does not apply where the individual is simply procedurally
barred, as by the running of the statute of limitations, from proceeding under Title VII, 20 7 but does apply where the plaintiff has obtained a judgment in a state court action if his federal section 1983
claim could have been, but was not, litigated in that state action.20 8
IV.

THE RESOLUTION:

SECTION

1983

MUST ALWAYS BE

AVAILABLE TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES

A dilemma has arisen in the employment discrimination law applicable to state and local government employees. The lower federal courts are producing conflicting decisions 20 9 which create
significant, detrimental procedural, substantive, and remedial consequences for those employees who are affected.2 10 Currently, the
federal antidiscrimination relief available to state and local government employees varies among jurisidictions. This is clearly an unsatisfactory situation, as federal law ought to be uniformly applied.
It is time for a definitive, uniform solution.
This Note asserts that Title VII was not intended to be, nor
should it be read as, an exclusive remedy available to employees of
203. Wells v. Hutchinson, 499 F. Supp. 174, 189 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
204. Ludwig v. Quebecor Dailies, Inc., 483 F. Supp. 594, 596 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
205. 649 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1981).
206. Flowers v. Local 6, Laborers Int'l Union of N. Am., 431 F.2d 205, 207 (7th Cir.
1970); Fekete v. United States Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331, 336 (3d Cir. 1970). This is true
regardless of whether the EEOC did or did not find cause to believe the allegation. The
nonpreclusiveness of the "cause to believe" finding is considered appropriate due to the
nonadjudicatory nature of the EEOC and the informality of its procedures. Note, supra note
28, at 1205.
207. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 1125.
208. Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 83 (1984).
209. See supra notes 49-137 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 138-208 and accompanying text.
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state and local governments. Section 1983 ought to be available regardless of any showing of an independent basis. This position is
founded on three interrelated premises. First, the legislative history
and purpose of the 1972 amendments to Title VII inescapably leads
to the conclusion that the extension of Title VII was meant to supplement, rather than supplant, the preexisting remedy under section
1983. Courts have drawn analogous conclusions in other areas
based on legislative history. 2 11 Secondly, plaintiffs who set forth discrimination claims under section 1983 are not simply asserting a
Title VII claim through the remedial device of section 1983 but are
requesting relief from state actions which violate constitutional
rights. Section 1983 was designed precisely to afford such relief.
Finally, both Title VII and section 1983 can comfortably coexist in
the federal scheme to combat employment discrimination in the
public sector.
When a statute does not explicitly address an issue, courts must
strive to interpret the words of the statute in light of,212 and to promote rather than defeat,2 13 the underlying legislative purpose.
When ascertaining congressional intent, courts should not limit
their investigation to an isolated portion of the statute,21 4 but
should consider the entire statute in light of "the purpose the original enactment served, the discussion of statutory meaning in committee reports, the effect of amendments-whether accepted or
rejected-and the remarks in debate preceeding passage. ' 215 Finally, the courts must be mindful that the creation of a new remedy
does not automatically invalidate existing remedies. "The courts are
not at liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments,
and when two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of
the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the
contrary, to regard each as effective. ' 21 6 Any intention to repeal
211. See infra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
212. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rts. Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
213. General Motors Corp. v. Toyota Motor Co., 467 F. Supp. 1142, 1156 n.27 (S.D.
Ohio 1979).
214. Don't Tear It Down, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Ave. Dev. Corp., 642 F.2d 527, 533 (D.C.

Cir. 1980).
215. Rogers v. Frito-Lay Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1080 (5th Cir. 1980).
216. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974). See also Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S.
259, 267 (1981) ("We must read the statutes to give effect to each if we can do so while
preserving their sense and purpose."); Ridgeway v. United States, 558 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir.
1977) ("Where Congress has enacted legislation on a particular subject. . . subsequent legislation will not be construed to modify, repeal or supplant the legislation, particularly where
both statutes serve distinct purposes... [riather, the courts will reconcile the earlier statute
and the later legislation if possible.").
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prior acts must be shown through clear and manifest evidence.2 17
Courts must therefore interpret Title VII according to these
doctrines of statutory construction. 2 18 Title VII is silent on the issue of exclusivity. It contains no indication of exclusivity in its language. Therefore, the courts must examine the statutory scheme in
its entirety, and also the legislative history, for evidence of congressional intent regarding exclusivity. As a starting point, the courts
must note that Title VII does not automatically override the remedy, albeit cumbersome, provided by section 1983.
It is anything but clear that Congress intended to repeal section
1983 as a remedy for state and local employees. The 1972 amendments to Title VII were not the first federal statutes to protect state
and local government employees from unlawful job discrimination.
Such employees were already protected under the fourteenth
amendment through section 1983. Thus, one explanation for the
exclusion of state and local government employees from the original
provisions of Title VII is that Congress may have believed that
these employees already were adequately protected from employment discrimination. Because of this omission, however, state and
local government employees were denied the opportunity Congress
provided their counterparts in the private sector: the right to proceed with a federal remedy for employment discrimination which in
its initial stages allows for dispute resolution through informal
mechanisms. This restriction, combined with the "empty promise"
of section 1983 "due to the expense and time involved in pursuing a
Federal court suit,"2 1 9 probably contributed to the widespread employment discrimination by state and local government employers
prior to the 1,972 amendments.22 0
217. In Posadas v. National City Bank, the Supreme Court declared that even implied
repeals are disfavored and should only be found in two circumstances: (I) if the provisions of
both statues are irreconcilable, the latter act will be considered as repealing the conflicting
provisions of the earlier one, and (2) if the subsequent act covers the whole first act and is
intended as repealing the earlier act, with legislative intention being clear and manifest, it will
be so construed. 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).
218. McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1285 (Wyo. 1980).
219. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprintedin 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2137, 2153.
220. A 1969 report by the United States Commission on Civil Rights concluded that
"[s]tate and local governments have failed to fulfill their obligation to assure equal job opportunity ....Not only do State and local governments consciously and overtly discriminate in
hiring and promoting minority group members, but they do not foster positive programs to
deal with discriminatory treatment on the job." ForAll the People... By All the People: A
Report on Equal Opportunityin State and Local Government Employment, excerpts reprinted
in 118 CONG. Rac. 1070 (1972).
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In 1972, the stage was set for Congress to provide state and local
government employees with another device to combat employment
discrimination. There was "no reason why persons working in the
public sector should not enjoy the same protection and rights as
those in the private. ' 2 1 The evidence indicates that this was Congress' rationale when it expanded the scope of Title VII in 1972.
Congressional concern was two-fold. First, Congress perceived an
injustice to the state and local employees who were denied an administrative forum which was available to their counterparts in the
private sector.2 22 Secondly, "the adequacy of protection against
employment discrimination by state and local governments has
been severely impeded by the failure of the Congress to provide
Federal administrative -machinery to assist the aggrieved employee., 22 3 One of the first courts to consider this area after the
1972 amendments concluded that the amended Title VII obviously
signified a congressional admission that section 1983 was inadequate to the task of eradicating employment discrimation in state
and local government.2 2 4
The overall scheme of Title VII supports the conclusion that it
is supplementary to preexisting remedies. The deferral provisions
of Title VII require claimants initially to proceed with state remedies (many of which were in existence prior to the enactment of
Title VII) prior to commencement of a Title VII remedy.2 25 The
lack of an explicit statement of nonexclusivity is understandableunder standard doctrines of statutory construction, Congress would
not expect courts to assume that section 1983 had been repealed.
Although the language of Title VII does not explicitly state that
it supplements section 1983, the legislative history of Title VII
makes this conclusion very clear.2 2 6 The House Education and La221. 117 CONG. REc. 32,105 (1971) (statement of Sen. Mink).
222. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2137, 2153-54.
223. Id.
224. Smiley v. City of Montgomery, 350 F. Supp. 451, 456 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
225. Note, supra note 199, at 385-86.
226. Although in dicta, the Supreme Court has recognized the supplementary nature of
Title VII in this context. In Great American Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, the Court
stated that the legislative history of Title ViI's 1972 amendments demonstrates that § 1981
and § 1983 would not be implicitly repealed. 442 U.S. 366, 377 n.21 (1979). In his dissent,
Justice White recognized that the majority had reached this conclusion. Id. at 396. The
Court restated this in another case, noting that "legislative enactments in this area have long
evinced a general intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies against discrimination."
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974).
Decisions finding that § 1983 is preempted where a statute is endowed with its own comprehensive remedial measures, see supranote 79, can be distinguished by the fact that in those
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bor Committee made a clear analogy to section 1981:
In establishing the applicability of Title VII to State and local
government employees, the Committee wishes to emphasize that
the individual's right to file a civil action in his own behalf, pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1870 and 1871, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 1983, is in no way affected.... Title VII was envisioned as an independent statutory authority meant to provide an
aggrieved individual with an additional remedy to redress employment discrimination. Two recent court decisions ...

have

aflirmed this Committee's belief that the remedies available to
the individual under Title VII are co-extensive with the individual's right to sue under the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and that the two procedures augment
each other and are not mutually exclusive. The bill, therefore, by
extending jurisdiction to State and local government employees
does not affect existing rights that such individuals have already
been granted by previous legislation.227
After explaining in detail the working relationship between the
EEOC and the federal courts when an individual submits his claim
to the EEOC, the drafters asserted that "neither the above provisions regarding the individual's right to sue under Title VII, nor any
of the other provisions of this bill, are meant to affect the existing
rights granted under other laws."' 228 The most emphatic statement

asserting nonexclusive intent again comes from the House Education and Labor Committee Report: "Inclusion of state and local
employees among those enjoying the protection of Title VII provides an alternateadministrative remedy to the existing prohibition
against discrimination perpetuated 'under color of state law' as embodied in the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. " 229
Furthermore, Congress explicitly consideredand rejected the possibility of making Title VII an exclusive remedy. Two amendments
to this effect were proposed and rejected. Senator Hruska's proposed amendment would have made Title VII "the exclusive remedy of any person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful
instances the legislative history was entirely silent on the issue of preemption. Storey v.
Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 600 F. Supp. 838, 840 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
227. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2137, 2154. Both cases referred to in the House Report found that Title VII was
not a barrier to a § 1981 suit for private discrimination. Young v. International Tel. and Tel.
Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Saunders v. Dobbs House, 432 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970).
The Young court noted that conciliation should not be disregarded, and that since most
§ 1981 plaintiffs will be seeking equitable relief, the availability of conciliation by the EEOC
will be a factor weighed in granting relief. 438 F.2d at 764.
228. S.REP.No. 415, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1971).
229. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprintedin 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2137, 2154 (emphasis added).
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employment practice of an employer, employment agency, or labor
organization. 2 3' This proposal was rejected by the Senate on both
the original vote23 1 and again on a motion to reconsider.2 32 The
House had already attempted and failed to incorporate a similar
the Senate's rejection of the Hruska
exclusivity provision. 233 After th
amendment, the House abandoned exclusivity altogether.2 34
The statements of concerned Senators exemplify the ultimate

legislative position on exclusivity. Senator Williams noted that the
purpose of the 1972 amendments was to "correct deficiencies in the
original provisions and to strengthen national policy against employment discrimination. ' 235 He thought that the Hruska amendment would substantially reduce Congress' ability to rectify and
remedy cases of employment discrimination, 236 and that "to lock
the aggrieved person into the administrative remedy would narrow
rather than strengthen our civil rights enforcement effort."'237 Sena-

tor Javits recognized that "[t]here are other remedies, but those
other remedies are not surplusage. Those other remedies are
needed to implement the promise we make under the Constitution
1871,
to prevent discrimination in employment. The laws of 1866,
' 238
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to
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1964
of
law
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as
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as
This same legislative history was cited by the Supreme Court in
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.2 39 The Court specifically
230. Proposed amend. no. 877 amending S.2515, reprintedin 2 Legislative History of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, at 1382 (1972). Senator Hruska argued that,
without an exclusivity provision, respondent employers would be subjected to multiple, nonpreclusive actions in a number of separate and distinct forums which would inhibit conciliation, and also, that employees would bypass the administrative process. 118 CONG. REC.
3368-70 (1972) (statements of Sen. Hruska).
231. 118 CONG. Rac. 3373 (1972).
232. Id. at 3965.
233. 117 CONG. RPc. 32110-11 (1971).
234. Joint ExplanatoryStatement of Managersat the Conference on H.R. 1746 to Further
Promote Equal Employment Opportunitiesfor American Workers, reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 2179, 2181-82. But see Brief for Appellee at 20, Trigg, 766 F.2d
at 299, for an argument that the House retreated on the exclusivity provision on the grounds
that Title VII could only be construed as the exclusive remedy and that an explicit provision
covering it was unnecessary, or that it was a decision thought best left up to the courts.
235. 118 CONG. REC. 3371 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams). Senator Williams stated
that the congressional purpose was not to repeal existing civil rights remedies for employment
discrimination, and that making Title VII the exclusive remedy would be tantamont to negating the "entire legislative history of the Civil Rights Act." Id. at 3372.
236. Id. at 3371.
237. Id. at 3372. He added that, because of very long backlogs in EEOC and trial delays,
Congress should augment, not diminish, the range of remedies available. Id. at 3371.
238. 118 CONG. REc. 3959 (1972) (statement of Sen. Javits).
239. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
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referred to the House Report and the Senate's failed exclusivity
amendment and found that "Congress has made [a choice] available
to the claimant by its conferring upon him independent administrative and judicial remedies," 2" under Title VII and section 1981.
Since section 1983 was considered concurrently with section 1981
throughout the legislative process, the same conclusion applies to
section 1983-it is only a matter of time before the Court makes the
same explicit finding regarding section 1983 as it has made with
respect to section 1981.
In light of the purposes of extending Title VII protections to
state and local government employees in 1972, the legislative history supporting those amendments, and persuasive Supreme Court
analysis of analogous circumstances, only one conclusion is reasonable. Congress designed the extension to give these employees the
option of an expeditious mechanism for resolution of their employment discrimination claims. 2 4
This same conclusion was even recognized by the district court
in Tafoya v. Adams,2 42 a case which subscribed to the view that
Title VII is exclusive. Tafoya would allow simultaneous resolution
of a section 1983 claim and a Title VII claim, as long as the two
have an independent factual basis.2 43 Surely, this possibility could
not exist if Title VII entirely eclipses section 1983. The Tafoya
court's real concern, which seems to be at the hub of the exclusivity
issue, is the proper application of Maine v. Thiboutot 2 4 to the public sector employment context. In Thiboutot, the Supreme Court
found that the remedial device of section 1983 could be used to remedy violations of federal statutory law as well as violations of constitutionally guaranteed rights.2 45 Although not explicitly stated, the
Tafoya court's concern is evident in its observation that "[t]he legislative history, however, does not indicate whether Congress intended to permit the concurrent assertion of Title VII claims with
240. Id at 459-61. The Court also noted that the two Acts were not coextensive in that
"Title VII offers assistance in investigation, conciliation, counsel, waiver of court costs, and
attorneys' fees, items that are unavailable at least under the specific terms of § 1981." Id. at
460. See also supra note 218 and accompanying text.
241. One author has suggested the availability of other potential common law causes of
action for employment discrimination including: wrongful termination, tortious interference
with the employment relationship, intentional breach of an implied contractual relationship,
and intentional infliction of employment discrimination. Platte, supra note 182, at 546-47.
242. 612 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Colo. 1985).
243. Id at 1102-03. See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.

244. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
245. Id7 at 4. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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§ 1981 claims and § 1983 claims in a single judicial proceeding. 214 6
Other courts also appear reluctant to allow plaintiffs to use the
remedial device of section 1983 to assert violations of federal statutory law, such as provisions of Title VII, and simply bypass the
administrative process set forth in Title VII. This apprehension derives from a misconception of what section 1983 plaintiffs, who are
state or local government employees, are doing when they are asserting their claims. They are using section 1983 to remedy violations of constitutional rights,24 7 not violations of the substantive
rights granted by Title VII. State and local government employees
benefit uniquely from the fact that the state is their employer, and
therefore any unconstitutional employment discrimination may
have been conducted "under color of state law," so that section
1983 applies.
The Supreme Court precedent cited by those courts claiming Title VII exclusivity is distinguishable and unpersuasive. In Brown v.
G.S.A., the Court prohibited afederal employee from bypassing the
Title VII remedy.24 8 Within Title VII, Congress specifically enacted an independent, comprehensive scheme for federal employees,
consisting of administrative and judicial remedies.2 4 9 But state and
local government employees are not provided for in the same manner as federal employees-Congress simply included them in the
Title VII provisions which protect private sector employees. Analogy to federal government employees is unwarranted. GreatAmerican Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny"' ° is also distinguishable.
There, a private sector employee obtained federal court jurisdiction
through section 1985(3) and had no substantive basis other than
Title VII upon which to base his claim, so the Court denied it.2 '
That private sector plaintiff was attempting to bypass the administrative process through "artful pleading." The state or local government employee, in contrast, does have another basis upon which
to rest his substantive claim: the fourteenth amendment.
It is clear that Title VII's 1972 amendments did not repeal the
constitutional rights granted to state and local government employees, nor the device to remedy violations of them. Therefore, the
246. Tafoya, 612 F. Supp. at 1102.
247. This is precisely what section 1983 was originally designed to do. See supra notes
15-17 and accompanying text.
248. 425 U.S. at 834. See supra notes 65-70 and 111-14 and accompanying text.
249. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
250. 442 U.S. 366 (1979). See supra notes 71-75 and 115-20.
251. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 369-70. Novotny's Title VII claim had been dismissed. See
supra note 69.
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only reasonable conclusion is that these employees may still use section 1983 to remedy constitutional violations regardless of the existence of some independent factual basis for the section 1983 claim.
It is difficult to understand why some jurisdictions demand an independent factual basis. There is no reason why a single set of facts
could not support both a Title VII and a section 1983 claim. Certainly, a court must require the plaintiff to exhaust the Title VII
administrative remedies before judicial determination of the Title
VII claim.2 52 However, the court should not dismiss the section
1983 claim if the plaintiff can make the requisite showing of a constitutional or statutory violation and meet the "under color of state
law" requirement. If the plaintiff has exhausted the administrative
process and brings suit based on both section 1983 and Title VII,
the court should not dismiss the section 1983 claim nor require an
independent factual basis since the plaintiff is simply asserting his
constitutional rights.
The state or local government employee will actually have an
independent substantive basis (such as the fourteenth amendment),
which is entirely separate and distinct from Title VII's substantive
rights. Also, the section 1983 plaintiff must demonstrate disparate
treatment (intentional discrimination), whereas a Title VII plaintiff
only has the burden of demonstrating disparate impact (discriminatory effects).2 53 Any assertion that the Title VII plaintiff would assume the additional burdens associated with section 1983, simply to
avoid the time delay of at least initiating the administrative process,
is ludicrous.
Finally, there is an issue of fairness. Section 1983 plaintiffs are
entitled to trial by jury and to certain remedial devices which are
not available to Title VII claimants.2 54 To require a true section
1983 plaintiff to call his first claim a Title VII claim would eliminate
that plaintiff's ability to seek the very recovery that was designed to
deter constitutional violations.
The state or local government employee must have a choice. He
can proceed under section 1983 and assume the additional burdens
252. Analogizing from the Johnson decision, the § 1983 statute of limitations would not
be tolled by the filing of a charge with the EEOC. Thus, in order to preserve the § 1983 claim
the plaintiff should either file both claims in district court and petition the court to stay the
proceedings until the administrative process is completed, or "take the minimal steps necessary to preserve each claim independently." Johnson, 421 U.S. at 465-66. Although the defendant may argue that this places too great a burden on his resources, the result follows
directly from a congressional policy judgment. Id.
253. See infra notes 159-70 and accompanying text.
254. See infra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
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it imposes, or he can use Title VII and initially attempt to seek resolution in the administrative realm. As the Supreme Court noted in
holding that section 1981 is independent of Title VII, "[T]he choice
is a valuable one. Under some circumstances, the administrative
route may be highly preferred... under others the reverse may be
true."2 ' Notwithstanding the obstacles and delays involved in
completing a section 1983 claim, punitive and compensatory damage awards may lie at the end of a successful section 1983 claim.
That possibility must remain open to state and local government
employees." 6 Although it has been argued that there is unfairness
in allowing government employees, but not private sector employees, the right to immediate judicial access and other "fringe benefits" of a section 1983 claim,25 7 private sector employers simply do
not have the unique protection of section 1983, nor do they need
protection from the state in their employment arrangements.
To restrict state and local government employees to Title VII's
administrative process, or to potentially biased state remedies,
would severely undermine the federal effort to prohibit employment
discrimination by state and local governments. Section 1983 and
Title VII must act as a "flexible network of remedies to guarantee
equal employment opportunities."
V.

2 58

CONCLUSION

The federal courts are in dire need of a decisive resolution to
their uncertainty over whether state and local government employees may pursue claims under both Title VII and section 1983.259
The legislative history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII, which
expanded the scope of Title VII's provisions to include state and
local government employers,2 60 plainly demonstrates congressional
255. Johnson, 421 U.S. 461.
256. Furthermore, the EEOC process has always been accompanied by a deluge of
backlogged cases. A 1974 report showed that the EEOC takes 2 1/2 years to process a
charge, another showed that the average time was 32 months. Hill, supra note 25, at 69. The
EEOC
has traditionally been hampered by inadequate funding and a shortage of staff to
These problems... have resulted in
meet the rising number of complaints ....
administrative problems and an ever-increasing backlog 6f pending charges which
will further slow the agency's ability to undertake effectively the new responsibilities
which it has been granted.
Sape & Hart, supra note 24, at 889.
257. Meyett v. Coleman, 613 F. Supp. 39 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
258. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 472.
259. See supra notes 49-137 and accompanying text.
260. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.

TITLE VII AS A REMEDY

intent to allow state and local government employees to simultaneously seek relief under both statutory provisions. 2 6 ' Since each of
these claims rests on a separate and independent substantive basis,
the inescapable conclusion is that both claims may be brought in the
same judicial proceeding after exhaustion of the Title VII administrative process, regardless of whether they are founded upon the
same factual allegations.
BRIAN RICHARD HENRY

261. See supra notes 226-38 and accompanying text.

